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The CFPB’s Ambiguous “Abusive” Standard

I. INTRODUCTION
A cloud of uncertainty rests over the Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), and this uncertainty extends to more than
just the future existence of the agency. The Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) was enacted in
2010, bringing with it an abundance of financial regulation and reform. 1
Dodd-Frank also created the CFPB and granted to it the power to
“regulate the offering and provision of consumer financial products or
services under the Federal consumer financial laws.”2 This mandate
includes the authority to protect consumers from “unfair, deceptive, or
abusive acts or practices” (collectively “UDAAP”). 3 The Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) traditionally had the authority to prevent and
punish unfair and deceptive behavior, and as a result there is already a
fairly well-established body of law on those two legal standards. 4 The
abusive standard, on the other hand, has lacked statutory, judicial, and
administrative clarity since its inception. 5 Until recently, the CFPB had
never brought an action alleging solely abusive behavior, as the agency
typically includes a claim of abuse with a claim of deception or
unfairness. 6 However, the cloud may finally be lifting, as the CFPB
recently brought two administrative proceedings based solely on
allegations of abusive behavior.7 These cases present the only standalone abuse claims, and their analysis reveals a great deal of ambiguity
surrounding the CFPB’s definition and application of the “abusive”

1. Infra notes 2–4.
2. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §

1101, 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (2016).
3. Dodd-Frank § 1021, 12 U.S.C. § 5511(b)(2).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2016) (defining “unfair” and “deceptive” acts and practices, and
providing examples of behavior that qualifies as such).
5. See infra Part II.C.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part III.
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standard.8 Ultimately, the CFPB should further define the standard in
order to provide consumers and financial institutions with clarity and
stability. 9
This Note proceeds in five parts. Part II briefly outlines the
statutory framework of the CFPB’s authority, focusing on the ambiguity
surrounding the abusive standard and discussing support for and criticism
of the standard.10 Part III discusses CFPB v. Aequitas Capital
Management, Inc., and the Zero Parallel proceeding, which represent the
only two occasions the CFPB has brought a stand-alone abuse claim. 11
Part IV discusses CFPB v. Navient Corporation, and the Flurish
proceeding, in order to determine whether the abuse claims were truly
necessary in Aequitas and Zero Parallel.12 Finally, Part V concludes by
analyzing the problems with the abusive standard, providing specific
recommendations for the CFPB and financial institutions moving
forward.13
II. “ABUSIVE” ACTS OR PRACTICES UNDER DODD-FRANK
A.

Legislative Framework

As previously mentioned, the CFPB inherited the unfair and
deceptive legal standards from the FTC,14 and was granted the power to
regulate abusive acts or practices under Dodd-Frank. 15 While the unfair
and deceptive standards were defined by the FTC in cases spanning
several decades, the CFPB was given a clean slate with respect to the
abusive standard.16 In fact, the statutory language provides the only
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

See infra Part III.
See infra Part V.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
See infra Part V.
See Consumer Finance Monitor, How the CFPB and the FTC Interact (Part 1),
BALLARD SPAHR, LLC (Jul. 7, 2011), https://www.consumerfinancemonitor.com/2011/07/
07/how-the-cfpb-and-the-ftc-interact-part-i/ (describing how the Dodd-Frank Act allocates
responsibilities between the two agencies).
15. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) §§
1021, 1031, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5511(b)(2), 5531(a) (2016) (emphasis added).
16. See Patrick M. Corrigan, Abusive Acts and Practices: Dodd-Frank’s Behaviorally
Informed Authority Over Consumer Credit Markets and Its Application to Teaser Rates, 18
N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 128–29 (2015) (describing the history of the unfair and
deceptive prongs as they relate to the FTC and CFPB); see How Will the CFPB Function
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official guidance with respect to the abusive standard. Dodd-Frank
defines as abusive any act or practice that:
(1) [M]aterially interferes with the ability of a consumer
to understand a term or condition of a consumer financial
product or service; or (2) takes unreasonable advantage
of (A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer
of the material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or
service; (B) the inability of the consumer to protect the
interests of the consumer in selecting or using a consumer
financial product or service; or (C) the reasonable
reliance by the consumer on a covered person to act in the
interests of the consumer. 17
Similarly, the categorization of “unfair” applies to any conduct
where: (1) “the act or practice causes or is likely to cause substantial
injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers;”
and (2) “such substantial injury is not outweighed by countervailing
benefits to consumers or to competition.”18
Interestingly, Dodd-Frank does not define deceptive practices. 19
However, the CFPB has published examples of deceptive behavior. 20 In
addition, the CFPB has litigated cases against financial institutions for
solely deceptive behavior.21 In these cases, courts ignore the lack of a
statutory definition and rely on a common law definition of deception. 22
Under Richard Cordray: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on TARP, Financial Services, and
Bailouts of Public and Private Programs Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government
Reform, 112th Cong.1, 2 (2012) [hereinafter Cordray Statement] (statement of Richard
Cordray, Director of the CFPB) (referencing prior CFPB officials’ inability to answer the
“simple question about the definition of abusive”).
17. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d).
18. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c).
19. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531.
20. Published examples of deceptive behavior include inadequate disclosure of material
lease terms in television advertising and misrepresentation about loan terms, such as
characterizing adjustable rate mortgages as fixed rate mortgages. CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU, CFPB LAWS AND REGULATIONS, UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR
PRACTICES 1, 7 (2012), https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/
102012_cfpb_unfair-deceptive-abusive-acts-practices-udaaps_procedures.pdf [hereinafter
“CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS”].
21. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Gordon, 819 F.3d 1179 (9th Cir. 2016) (ruling in
favor of the CFPB’s allegation of deceptive practices by the defendant).
22. See id. at 1192–93 (citing a common law definition for “deceptive” in light of the
absence of a statutory definition).
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Case law establishes that an act or practice is deceptive if: “(1) there is a
representation, omission, or practice that, (2) is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the
representation, omission, or practice is material.”23
B.

“Abusive” Standard: History and Analysis

Prior to Dodd-Frank’s enactment, the abusive standard was
defended before Congress as an intentionally “flexible” standard,
partially in response to harmful activities leading up to the subprime
mortgage crisis.24 Additionally, a more flexible standard might have been
implemented to avoid the “cost-benefit” considerations present in the
unfair and deceptive standards. 25 Instead of focusing on whether the
consumer can reasonably avoid a service or product, the new standard
broadens the inquiry to whether there was any exploitation of consumer
biases.26 However, the statutory language for abusive behavior also
appears to retain the consideration of whether the financial institution
exploited consumers’ inability to protect themselves. 27
Aside from its exclusion of a cost-benefit component, it is
difficult to distinguish the abusive standard from the unfairness
standard.28 Based on the statutory language alone, the lines are blurred
between the abusive standard’s “inability to protect themselves”
requirement and the unfairness standard’s consideration of reasonable
23. Id.
24. See Improving Federal Consumer Protection in Financial Services: Hearing Before

the Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 40 (2007), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG110hhrg37556/html/CHRG-110hhrg37556.htm (introducing the “more flexible” abusive
standard as a possible method for increasing regulatory effectiveness in areas such as
mortgage lending); see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 172 (2010) (“Current law prohibits unfair
or deceptive acts or practices. The addition of ‘abusive’ will ensure that the Bureau is
empowered to cover practices where providers unreasonably take advantage of consumers.”).
25. Unfair acts or practices are permissible if they are “outweighed by countervailing
benefits to the consumer,” whereas abusive acts or practices are prohibited regardless of the
benefit to consumers. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“DoddFrank”) § 1031, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(c)–(d) (2016); see also Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v.
ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 904–06 (S.D. Ind. 2015) (ruling that the CFPB’s
“abusive” standard is not unconstitutional for vagueness, because legislative intent shows it
to be an intentionally “flexible standard” and the statute provides “at least the minimal level
of clarity” demanded by the Constitution).
26. Corrigan, supra note 16, at 128–29.
27. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d)(2)(B).
28. See Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5531(c)–(d) (including both a consideration of
avoidability and reasonableness in the definitions of unfair and abusive).
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avoidance. 29 As discussed later, these standards will become even more
unclear upon application.30 Ultimately, neither the statute nor the CFPB
provide much clarity on how to recognize risks a given consumer can
identify, what exactly constitutes material interference with consumer
understanding, or when a covered institution has taken “unreasonable”
advantage of consumer bias, as opposed to simply engaging in a shrewd
business transaction.31 While case law may solve these issues over time,
there are only two instances of abuse allegations being brought apart from
a claim of either deception or unfairness. 32 There is a high level of
uncertainty surrounding the legal issues at hand, and banks and financial
institutions cannot afford to wait years for judicial opinions and
administrative proceedings to unfold in order to understand the extent of
a given regulatory scheme. 33
C.

“Abusive” Standard: Criticism and Support

When questioned before Congress regarding the vague nature of
the new abusive standard, former CFPB Director Richard Cordray stated,
“[W]e have determined that [the definition of ‘abusive’] is going to have
to be a fact and circumstances issue; it is not something we are likely to
be able to define in the abstract. Probably not useful to try to define a
term like that in the abstract.”34 His answer is reminiscent of Justice
Stewart’s statement on obscenity: “I know it when I see it.”35 In regards
to whether the term actually represents a distinct legal standard, the CFPB
continues to claim that, although there may be overlap between standards
with respect to certain conduct, the abusive standard represents a distinct

29. See id. (utilizing similar concepts of reasonable avoidance and the inability to selfprotect).
30. See infra Parts III–IV.
31. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531; see also Cordray Statement, supra note 16, at
69 (quoting former CFPB Director Richard Cordray as saying “we are going to have to see
what kind of situations may arise where that would seem to fit the bill,” with respect to the
new abusive standard); CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 20, at 9.
32. See infra Part III.
33. See Tobie Stanger, Why the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is in Danger,
CONSUMER REPORTS (Mar. 13, 2017), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumer-financialprotection-bureau/why-consumer-financial-protection-bureau-is-in-danger/
(describing
complaints of the high costs to financial institutions resulting from CFPB regulation).
34. Cordray Statement, supra note 16, at 69.
35. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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legal standard.36 However, while the CFPB has put forth specific
examples of unfair and deceptive practices, it has yet to provide a clear
example of abusive conduct.37 In light of the events leading up to the
subprime mortgage crisis, some view the new standard as a necessary
measure in order to help promote vigilance and financial stability.38
However, even supporters of the new standard concede that such a
malleable standard provides the CFPB with an extraordinary amount of
power.39
While there may be benefits to greater regulatory oversight, there
are also risks associated with vague and arbitrary legal standards, and this
is even more pronounced in the highly regulated consumer finance
industry.40 One factor that has fueled uncertainty surrounding the new
standard is the CFPB’s tendency to allege two or more standards for the
same act or practice, thus blurring any lines of distinction between the
terms. 41 As expected, it is not uncommon for defendants to challenge the
abusive standard.42 However, thus far courts have either embraced
Congress’ intentional ambiguity,43 or avoided discussion of any
36. See generally CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 20 (setting
forth the three UDAAP standards as separate and distinct, but providing no examples of the
abusive standard).
37. See generally CFPB CONSUMER LAWS AND REGULATIONS, supra note 20 (providing
explicit examples of unfair and deceptive practices, but failing to provide any examples of
abusive practices).
38. Tiffany S. Lee, No More Abuse: The Dodd-Frank and Consumer Financial
Protection Act’s “Abusive” Standard, 14 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 118, 119 (2011) (arguing
that “abusive” was incorporated in response to the subprime mortgage crisis, and that the term
was necessary to “restore financial stability and confidence in our financial markets” at the
time it was passed).
39. See Eric M. Aberg, The Case for UDAAP-Based Credit Card Lending Regulations:
Providing Greater Financial Security for America and American Consumers, 84 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1029, 1065–66 (2016) (conceding that there may be overlap between “abusive” and
the other two standards, but arguing that the abusiveness prohibition is necessary to prevent
actions which might otherwise conform with regulatory requirements, but pass “harmful costs
onto consumers”).
40. Robert E. Bostram et al., Implications of the CFPB’s First Annual Report Regarding
the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 129 BANKING L.J. 529, 534–35 (2012) (emphasizing
the potential risks associated with the lack of legal precedence for the standards of what
constitutes “abusive” conduct).
41. See Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. NDG Fin. Corp., No. 15-CV-5211 (CM), 2016
WL 7188792 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2016) (describing the defendants’ allegedly unfair, deceptive,
and abusive debt collection practices).
42. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530
1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017) (ruling in favor of the CFPB’s allegations of unfair, deceptive, and
abusive practices, and denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss the “abusive” allegation).
43. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. ITT Educ. Servs., Inc., 219 F. Supp. 3d 878, 878 (S.D.
Ind. 2015).
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unnecessary legal standards completely. 44 In one case, the court declined
to discuss the defendant’s objections to the vagueness of the abusive
standard, because the CFPB had already satisfied the burden for
deceptive conduct, which was sufficient. 45
Currently, there is no CFPB rule defining the abusive authority
beyond the vague statutory language, nor is there any such rule under
development.46 This is particularly perplexing considering the outcry
from the private sector to provide further clarity.47 For example, the
Senior Vice President of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce urged former
CFPB Director Richard Cordray to provide a more explicit definition of
abusive behavior as early as 2012.48 One of the foremost criticisms of
the CFPB as an agency has been its “regulation by enforcement”
approach, as opposed to rule-based regulation.49 The outcry has started
to result in pushback, and challenges to CFPB enforcement actions have
risen substantially when compared to the first several years of the
agency’s existence. 50 Also, recent legislative action suggests that
dissatisfaction with the agency might be gaining political traction. 51
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Treasury has published criticism of
44. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. CashCall, Inc., No. CV15-7522-JFW (RAOx), 2016
WL 4820635 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 31, 2016) (ruling that, since the defendant engaged in deceptive
conduct, there was no need to consider whether the behavior was unfair or abusive).
45. Id.
46. CONSUMER FIN PROT. BUREAU FINAL RULES, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/
policy-compliance/rulemaking/final-rules (last visited Feb. 10, 2018); CONSUMER FIN. PROT.
BUREAU RULES UNDER DEVELOPMENT, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policycompliance/rulemaking/rules-under-development (last visited Feb. 10, 2018).
47. Infra notes 48–49.
48. Rob Blackwell, U.S. Chamber Pressures CFPB to Define “Abusive”, AM. BANKER,
July 3, 2012 (describing a letter from the president and chief executive of the U.S. Chamber’s
Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness to Richard Cordray, reminding him of the
CFPB’s responsibility to avoid “disparate standards” of law).
49. See JOSEPH L. BARLOON & ANAND S. RAMAN, CFPB DEFINES ‘UNFAIR,’ ‘DECEPTIVE’
AND ‘ABUSIVE’ PRACTICES THROUGH ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITY, S KADDEN’S 2015 INSIGHTS FINANCIAL REGULATION (Jan. 2015), https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/201
5/01/cfpb-defines-unfair-deceptive-and-abusive-practice (describing the language of the
UDAAP provision as “broad and vague,” which facilitates the enforcement-based regulation
strategy).
50. See Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law
Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057, 1097 (2016) (“[I]t is an empirically
demonstrable fact that in its first 5 years, the Bureau was able to reach a negotiated settlement
agreement with every bank subject to a public enforcement action.”).
51. See Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017) (seeking to limit
the CFPB’s UDAAP authority); see also H.R.J. 111, 115th Cong. (2017) (repealing the
CFPB’s Arbitration Agreements Rule); see also 12 C.F.R. Part 1040 (2017) (setting forth the
CFPB’s now-repealed Arbitration Agreements Rule).
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the CFPB’s enforcement tactics. 52 However, in the midst of growing
confusion and uncertainty, two recent CFPB actions might suggest the
agency is attempting to provide much-needed clarity to the term.
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
A.

Aequitas

The CFPB brought suit against Aequitas Capital Management,
Inc. (“Aequitas”) on August 17, 2017, representing the first-ever CFPB
UDAAP action brought solely on allegations of abusive acts or
practices.53 Specifically, the CFPB alleged that Aequitas financed and
provided a private student loan program in order to allow Corinthian
Colleges, Inc. (“Corinthian”) to feign compliance with federal law. 54 In
order for a for-profit school to gain access to Title IV funds, federal law
requires that at least 10% of revenue come from sources other than federal
student aid (commonly referred to as the “90/10 Rule”). 55 However,
Corinthian derived more than 90% of its revenue from federal student
loans. 56 In order to appear as if it were in compliance with this
requirement, Corinthian artificially inflated its tuition costs to exceed the
federal aid maximum, and convinced Aequitas to offer students highinterest tuition loans. 57 Aequitas carried out this scheme, knowing there
was a high probability of default and that the 10% threshold would not
52. See U.S. DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, BANKS AND CREDIT UNIONS : REPORT TO PRESIDENT
DONALD J. TRUMP 82 (2017), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/
Documents/A%20Financial%20System.pdf (“In practice, the CFPB has avoided notice-andcomment rulemaking and instead relied to an unusual degree on enforcement actions and
guidance documents, which the CFPB has consistently issued without opportunity for public
comment, to announce new standards of conduct.”).
53. Complaint of Plaintiff, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Aequitas Capital Mgmt., Inc.
(2017) (No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO); CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS,
https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/ (last visited Jan.
24, 2017).
54. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Aequitas Capital Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO
1, 2 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 2017).
55. Id. at 3. “Title IV funds” refers to federally subsidized loans, grants, and work study
programs that make is more affordable for students to attend qualified schools (Pell Grant,
Federal Perkins Loan, etc.). See generally U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 90/10 Revenue Test, at 2-55
(Apr. 2011), https://www2.ed.gov/offices/OSFAP/training/fundamentals/common/files/10
11FSAHbkVol2Master_60-62.pdf (describing Title IV Funds insofar as they relate to the 90/
10 institutional requirement).
56. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 3.
57. Id. at 3–4.
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be reached. 58 This failure occurred because Corinthian was required by
law to buy back defaulted loans from the defendants, which would negate
any revenue originally gained in the initial transaction. 59 Students were
not aware of the “scheme” behind the loans, and they lacked sufficient
knowledge of the inflated tuition. 60 Additionally, because they lacked
alternative loan options to pay for the inflated tuition, the CFPB
determined that the students could not adequately protect themselves. 61
In the only charge brought against the defendants, the CFPB alleged that
this funding scheme and support of the loan program constituted an
abusive act.62
The CFPB alleged that Aequitas took “unreasonable advantage
of a lack of understanding” by the student consumers, “the inability of
the consumer[s] to protect the[ir own] interests” in selecting the loan, and
“the reasonable reliance by the consumer[s]” that the school and its loan
providers would “act in the interests of the consumer[s]” on at least a
general level—i.e., not create and support an artificially-inflated tuition.63
According to the CFPB, this type of predatory and dishonest lending
scheme constituted an abusive act under Dodd-Frank. 64 The behavior
was deemed to satisfy the definition of “abusive” under the statute, and
thus there appears to be no issue with the application of the CFPB’s new
standard.65 Instead, the remaining issue is whether this type of behavior
must necessarily be brought under the abusive standard, or whether the
CFPB could just as easily categorize it as unfair.
B.

Zero Parallel

Only six days after the filing of Aequitas, the CFPB brought
another enforcement action alleging abusive behavior by Zero Parallel,
LLC (“Zero Parallel”).66 Zero Parallel is a company that receives leads
involving consumers seeking payday or installment loans, and then sells

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 3–4.
Id.
Id. at 9–11.
Id. at 26.
Id.
Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 26.
Id.
Zero Parallel, LLC, 2017 CFPB 0017 1 (Sept. 9, 2017).
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those leads to lenders and re-marketing companies. 67 The more a lender
is willing to pay Zero Parallel, the more likely they are to receive a lead. 68
Although Zero Parallel is not a lender, it is still a “covered person” under
Dodd-Frank because it provides a service to covered lenders, and thus
falls under the CFPB’s regulatory authority. 69 Among the lenders to
whom Zero Parallel actively sold leads were a number of small-dollar or
installment lenders that offer consumer loans for personal, family, or
household purposes. 70 After being connected with the borrower through
Zero Parallel’s website, the lenders collected the principal loan amount,
as well as interest and fees, directly from the consumer. 71
A number of states have laws that limit both the type of institution
that may engage in this type of payday lending, as well as the amount of
collectable interest.72 If a loan is found to violate these restrictions,
certain states will deem the entire loan to be void and uncollectable. 73
With full knowledge that certain loans would be partially or wholly void
under state law, Zero Parallel repeatedly sold consumer leads to lenders. 74
Citing the statutory definition of abusiveness under Dodd-Frank, the
CFPB alleged that Zero Parallel engaged in abusive acts and practices. 75
According to the CFPB, this standard was satisfied because Zero Parallel
“took unreasonable advantage of a lack of understanding on the part of
the consumer of the material risks, costs, and conditions of the loans.”76
Zero Parallel represented an unusual proceeding in that the harm
alleged was both to consumers subject to interest rates above the legal
limit, and to lenders who could not collect defaulted loans in such states. 77
However, the scope of this Note is limited solely to the harm to

67. Zero Parallel sold leads in all states requested by the purchaser except for New York,
West Virginia, Arkansas, and Vermont. Id. at 4.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id. at 1, 4; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
(“Dodd-Frank”) § 1002, 12 U.S.C. § 5481(6) (2016) (defining a “covered person” as: “(A)
any person that engages in offering or providing a consumer financial product or service; and
(B) any affiliate of a person described in subparagraph (A) if such affiliate acts as a service
provider to such person.”).
70. Zero Parallel, 2017 CFPB 0017 at 4.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 5.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Zero Parallel, LLC, 2017 CFPB 0017 1, 6 (Sept. 9, 2017)
76. Id.
77. Id. at 1–5.
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consumers. According to the CFPB, Zero Parallel took unreasonable
advantage of the customer’s lack of understanding of relevant state law
surrounding interest rates and valid lenders. 78 It was further alleged that
Zero Parallel took advantage of the expectation by the consumer that Zero
Parallel would not allow them to be connected with a loan that was legally
void.79 However, as in Aequitas, the key issue was not whether the broad
definition of abuse was satisfied, but whether the standard of unfairness
could have been just as easily met.
IV. COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS
A.

Aequitas and Navient: A Comparison

A recent case highlights a serious flaw in the CFPB’s “abuse”
allegations in Aequitas. In CFPB v. Navient Corp,80 the CFPB made
allegations of abusive behavior by defendant Navient (formerly Sallie
Mae). 81 Specifically, the CFPB alleged that students relied on Navient to
act in their best interest, and that Navient took advantage of that
reliance. 82 Navient allegedly engaged in abusive acts and practices by
“steering” students into forbearance when it was not financially
beneficial to the students. 83 It did so simply because forbearance plans
were less expensive and more convenient to administer than other
repayment options.84 In addition to the abuse claim, the CFPB alleged

78. Id. at 6.
79. Id.; see also Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-

Frank”) § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(d) (2016) (defining abusive behavior, in part, as that which
takes advantage of a consumer’s reasonable reliance on the covered entity to act in his or her
best interest).
80. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Navient Corp., No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530
1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 2017).
81. Id. at 1–2.
82. Id. at 2–3.
83. Forbearance plans impose high costs on the borrower, and are typically intended only
for those experiencing short-term financial difficulty. For those experiencing long-term
financial difficulties, an income-based repayment plan is generally more beneficial.
However, Navient advised student borrowers experiencing long-term financial difficulty to
enter into costly forbearance programs, eventually resulting in higher monthly payments and
a greater principal loan amount. Behavior like this “steering” prompted the CFPB to bring
action against the lender. Id.
84. Id.
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that these “steering” practices were both unavoidable and harmful, and
thus also satisfied the “unfair” standard.85
The fact pattern of Navient bears a striking resemblance to that of
Aequitas. Both cases involved lending to students that was beneficial to
the defendant at the expense of the consumer, and in both cases the
student borrowers materially relied on information provide by the
defendant to their detriment. 86 However, in the Aequitas case involving
the scheme to inflate tuition, the CFPB relied on only the “abuse”
allegation. 87 On the other hand, in the Navient “steering” case, the CFPB
relied on both the abusive and unfairness standards.88 Upon close
analysis, that key difference is difficult to reconcile. In Navient, the only
difference between the “abusive” and “unfair” allegations was the
consideration of whether the benefits to students outweighed the harm
(under the unfairness standard).89 The benefits to students in that case
did not outweigh the harm, and the standard for unfairness was clearly
met.90 Accordingly, it is unclear why allegations of unfairness were not
brought in Aequitas as they were in Navient.91
Applying the statutory definition of unfairness to the facts of
Aequitas, the act or practice was likely to cause substantial financial
injury to consumers that was not reasonably avoidable by consumers, as
the students had no way to know of the unlawful scheme existing between
Corinthian and Aequitas.92 In addition, countervailing benefits certainly
did not outweigh the injury to students. 93 In fact, students could not
possibly benefit from a scheme where their tuition was raised and highinterest loans were implemented to profit from their inability to pay the

85. Navient, No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530 at 51–52.
86. Id.; see Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Aequitas Capital Mgmt., Inc., No. 3:17-cv-

01278-MO 1, 2 (D. Or. Aug. 17, 2017) (“[S]tudents had no way of knowing was only for a
sham tuition charge solely to gain access to Title IV funds.”).
87. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 26.
88. Navient, No. 3:17-CV-101 at 50–51.
89. Id.
90. Navient, No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530 at 50–51; Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (2016).
91. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 2; Navient, No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL
3380530 at 50–51.
92. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 9–11 (“[S]tudents had no way of knowing was
only for a sham tuition charge solely to gain access to Title IV funds.”).
93. Id.
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higher rate.94 In addition, Navient preceded Aequitas, and thus would
have supported the application of the unfairness standard to student loan
practices.95
Given the striking similarity of fact patterns between the two
cases and the clear satisfaction of the statutory language, the CFPB could
have just as easily relied on an allegation of unfairness in the Aequitas
case. 96 That fact does not bode well for the doubters of the CFPB’s new
standard of abuse under Dodd-Frank. Relying solely on analysis of
Aequitas, the abusive standard is not necessary. 97 As far as Aequitas is
concerned, the CFPB is more than properly equipped with only the
unfairness and deception standards inherited from the FTC.98 In addition,
the unfairness and deception standards have decades of case law
supporting them, whereas the “abusive” standard on its own is supported
by just two cases. 99
B.

Zero Parallel and Flurish: A Comparison

In another payday loan action preceding the Zero Parallel case,
the CFPB brought an action against Flurish, Inc (“Flurish”).100 Among
other allegations, the CFPB alleged that Flurish engaged in unfair acts
and practices by charging borrowers fees which they were completely
unaware of prior to default.101 Applying the unfairness standard, the
CFPB concluded that these undisclosed fees were likely to cause
substantial harm to borrowers that could not be reasonably avoided, and
that the countervailing benefits provided to the consumer did not
outweigh this harm. 102
Once again, the two cases present a similar fact pattern. Both
cases involve a “covered person” that knowingly facilitated lending

94. Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 9–11; Navient, No. 3:17-CV-101 at 50–51;
Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)–(d).
95. Navient was filed in January, 2017, and Aequitas was filed in August, 2017. Navient,
No. 3:17-CV-101, 2017 WL 3380530 at 1; Aequitas, No. 3:17-cv-01278-MO at 1.
96. Id.; Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c)–(d).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Supra Part III.
100. Flurish, Inc., d/b/a LendUp, 2016-CFPB-0023 1 (Sept. 27, 2016) (consent order).
101. Id. at 9.
102. Id.; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”)
§ 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c) (2016).
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practices where consumers were unaware of a latent financial risk at the
time they entered into the loan agreement.103 Comparison of the cases
begs the question: Why was unfairness not alleged against Zero Parallel,
as it was against Flurish? Applying the statutory unfairness standard,
Zero Parallel engaged in an act or practice that was likely to cause
substantial injury to borrowers, as its actions resulted in or were likely to
result in higher interest rates and legally void loans. 104 Also, the injury
was not reasonably avoidable by consumers, as it would be unreasonable
to assume consumers are aware of state law with respect to loan interest
caps and who constitutes a valid lender. 105 In addition, considering the
CFPB described Zero Parallel’s behavior as taking unreasonable
advantage of consumers, it is unlikely that the agency would allege that
the injuries were outweighed by countervailing consumer benefits. 106
Given the similar fact patterns between the cases and the straightforward
application of the statutory language, it is likely that the CFPB could have
brought a successful unfairness claim against Zero Parallel.107 Moreover,
the action against Flurish would have provided precedent for such a
claim. 108
V. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION
As demonstrated by analysis of the only two stand-alone abuse
cases, the abusive and unfairness standards are interchangeable, and the
CFPB’s future use of the new standard remains unclear.109 As it currently
stands, there is no persuasive reason for retaining the “abusive”
standard.110 Even for purposes of imposing penalties, the standard serves

103. See generally Zero Parallel, LLC, 2017 CFPB 0017 1 (Sept. 9, 2017) (describing Zero
Parallel’s actions as taking unreasonable advantage of the consumers’ lack of understanding);
see generally Flurish, 2016-CFPB-0023 1 (describing Flurish’s actions as being likely to
mislead consumers, and finding that Flurish did not provide consumers with all of the relevant
information).
104. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c); Flurish, 2016-CFPB-0023 at 9.
105. Id.
106. Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12 U.S.C. § 5531(c); Flurish, 2016-CFPB-0023 at 9 (Sept. 27,
2016) (consent order); see also Zero Parallel, 2017 CFPB 0017 at 6 (alleging abusive
behavior wherein the defendant “took unreasonable advantage” of the consumer’s lack of
understanding).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Supra Parts III–IV.
110. Supra Parts III–IV.
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no apparent purpose. 111 While the CFPB can impose a penalty of up to
$1 million for every day that a financial institution knowingly violates
federal consumer financial law, there is no statutory language to suggest
that a financial entity charged with unfairness and abuse would receive
harsher sanctions than an entity charged with unfairness alone. 112
Ultimately, the standard appears to generate a great deal of criticism and
confusion without any apparent benefit to the CFPB or to consumers. 113
While it is possible this ambiguity could lead to confusion and
harm to financial institutions, several considerations might limit the
impact of such an effect. Initially, Aequitas and Zero Parallel involve
financial activities that are extremely controversial and politically
relevant. 114 Payday lending and student borrowing abuse are highly
contentious and hotly debated issues. 115 Consequently, by limiting its
application of the abusive standards to these issues, the CFPB is able to
further its policy initiatives in these developing areas of law. 116 The
widespread support for further regulation of these controversial financial
activities is likely to minimize any negative connotations surrounding the
use of the vague abusive standard.117 In addition, such enforcement
actions largely avoid stepping on the toes of the largest financial
institutions, who might be more prone to challenge allegations of

111. There is no statutory indication of a higher penalty for financial institutions violating
multiple UDAAP standards, as opposed to just one standard. See Dodd-Frank § 1031, 12
U.S.C. § 5565(c)(2)(C) (allowing a maximum penalty of $1 million per day as long as the
violation of CFPB law continues).
112. Id.
113. See supra Section II.C; see also supra Parts III–IV.
114. Lisa Servon, Are Payday Loans Harmful to Consumers?, 36 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS &
MGMT. 240, 240 (2017) (describing payday loans as “perhaps the most hotly debated”
consumer finance topic today); see also Laurie A. Lucas & Christopher L. Peterson,
Developments in Federal Student-Lending Law: Harbingers of Change?, 72 BUS. LAW. 465,
465 (describing the growing popular discontentment with the student loan system).
115. Id.
116. See Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Installment Loans, 81 Fed. Reg.
47864 (July 22, 2016) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1041 (2016)) (setting forth the finalized
law surrounding payday lending, and categorizing certain payday lending activities as unfair
and abusive); see also CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CFPB
STUDENT LOAN OMBUDSMAN: STRATEGIES FOR CONSUMER -DRIVEN REFORM 2–3 (2017),
https://s3.amazonaws.com/files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_annualreport_student-loan-ombudsman_2017.pdf (describing the CFPB’s expansive regulation of
student loans, with the agency handling over 50,700 student loan complaints between 2011
and 2017, and returning $750 million to student borrowers).
117. Servon, supra note 114; Lucas & Peterson, supra note 114.
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abuse.118 Historically, banks have been reluctant to contest any CFPB
action, but a stand-alone abuse allegation might present an opportunity. 119
As one Supreme Court opinion so accurately stated, “[b]anking
is one of the longest regulated and most closely supervised of public
callings.”120 As a result, clarity and precision of law in the area of finance
are extremely important.121 Consequently, such a blatant fluidity of legal
standards is extremely worrisome for several reasons. First, financial
institutions strive to be creatures of efficiency, and the CFPB should seek
to minimize the gray area of law as much as possible by removing
intentional ambiguity in order to increase oversight. 122 Second, in light
of recent criticism of the CFPB and talk of “defanging” the agency, the
CFPB should clearly convey its benefits and standards of enforcement to
the public.123
A recently-proposed House Appropriations bill includes
provisions for the overhauling of the CFPB. 124 If passed, this bill would
substantially limit the agency’s regulatory authority, strip the agency of
its UDAAP authority, and restrict its regulatory authority over payday
and vehicle-title loans.125 One U.S. Senator described the bill as an
attempt to “reign in the rogue” CFPB.126 While such a characterization
of the CFPB may not be completely accurate, it speaks to how the agency
118. See Nick Bourke, How OCC Can Help Banks Disrupt the Payday Loan Industry, AM.
BANKER (May 23, 2017), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/how-occ-can-helpbanks-disrupt-the-payday-loan-industry (describing how federal regulation has driven smallloan borrowers from banks, forcing consumers to turn to riskier loans from institutions such
as payday lenders).
119. Peterson, supra note 50, at 1097 (highlighting the glaring lack of challenges to CFPB
enforcement actions by banks).
120. Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947).
121. See Bostram et al., supra note 40, at 534–35 (“Careful vigilance and monitoring will
be required to ensure that the CFPB’s FDCPA supervisory efforts do not result in costly and
unnecessary burdens for participants in the debt collection market.”).
122. See Bostram et al., supra note 40, at 534–35 (arguing that the ambiguity surrounding
the application of the “abusive” standard could lead to the arbitrary punishment of previously
lawful activities).
123. See Rob Tricchinelli, Volcker Rule Repeal Included in Draft House Spending Bill,
BLOOMBERG BNA (June 28, 2017), https://www.bna.com/volcker-rule-repeal-n73014460949
(describing a recent appropriations bill’s proposal “gut” the CFPB of its primary regulatory
authorities as they currently exist); see also Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th
Cong. (2017) (seeking to strike the UDAAP authority from current law).
124. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017).
125. Tricchinelli, supra note 123; see also Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th
Cong. (2017).
126. Tricchinelli, supra note 123; see also Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th
Cong. (2017).
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is viewed by people who are seeking to limit the agency’s power.127 If
the perplexing application of its abusive standard is any indication,
perhaps reservations with the CFPB’s regulatory authority are not
entirely unfounded. 128
The future of the abusive standard is just as unclear as its current
implementation. Will the CFPB continue to primarily use the term in
conjunction with the other standards, or do Aequitas and Zero Parallel
mark the beginning of a new era for the standard? Will the CFPB provide
a distinct purpose and definition for the term—something its director was
previously unwilling to do129—or will the agency cease application of the
standard entirely? Unfortunately for “covered” financial entities, these
answers remain unclear. However, the CFPB should not continue to view
this ambiguity and broad oversight as a benefit to its authority. 130 The
future of the agency is uncertain, and at least one chamber of Congress
has shown itself willing to act in order to restrict its authority. 131 In
addition, there is speculation that the change in CFPB leadership could
result in a less proactive agency.132 If the agency adopts a less aggressive
approach to regulation, this might temporarily alleviate worries with

127. Tricchinelli, supra note 123; see also Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th
Cong. (2017).
128. Supra Parts III–IV.
129. Cordray Statement, supra note 16, at 69 (“[W]e have determined that [the definition
of ‘abusive’] is going to have to be a fact and circumstances issue; it is not something we are
likely to be able to define in the abstract. Probably not useful to try to define a term like that
in the abstract.”). An interesting concept, scholar Patrick M. Corrigan proposes that Congress
adopt a theory of “abusive” conduct which places the burden on financial institutions to show
a valid efficiency or business-related rationale for allegedly abusive behavior (other than
simply exploiting consumer bias). Corrigan, supra note 16, at 156–57.
130. Given that accusations of “rogue” or arbitrary behavior by the CFPB have played a
role in furthering legislation against the agency, more defined and narrow authority might
alleviate said concerns. See generally Tricchinelli, supra note 123 (quoting one congressman
and a proponent of the Financial Choice Act as saying the bill was designed to “reign in the
rogue” CFPB).
131. Financial CHOICE Act of 2017, H.R. 10, 115th Cong. (2017); Yuka Hayashi, CFPB
Head Cordray to Step Down, Paving Way for Change at Watchdog, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15,
2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/cfpb-director-richard-cordray-to-step-down-151076661
7; see also Am. Bankers Ass’n, Industry Defeats Arbitration Rule, 110 AM. BANKERS ASS’N
J. 14, 14 (Jan. 2018) (describing the repeal of the CFPB’s ban on mandatory arbitration clauses
as a “victory” for bankers).
132. Kate Berry, CFPB 2018 Outlook: More Deregulation, More Upheaval, AM. BANKER,
Jan. 3, 2018, https://www.americanbanker.com/news/cfpb-2018-outlook-more-deregulationmore-upheaval (describing acting CFPB Director Mick Mulvaney’s change to the agency’s
mission statement, adding that the agency will now pinpoint and address “outdated,
unnecessary or unduly burdensome regulations.”).
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respect to UDAAP overreach. 133 However, while the evolution of the
abusive standard might halt for the foreseeable future, there is always the
danger of its resurrection by a future administration. Ultimately, the
CFPB only stands to benefit from bringing further clarity, precision, and
stability to its legal standards.134
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133. Id.
134. See Stanger, supra note 33 (describing the criticism by institutions and politicians

that the CFPB’s overreach leads to inefficiency and greater costs).
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